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LEGISLATION
THE PENNSYLVANIA PERSONAL PROPERTY TAx-Probably few taxation
statutes, with the exception of the federal Income Tax Laws, have been the
source of so much uncertainty and despair to laymen as the Pennsylvania Per-
sonal Property Tax. First imposed in i83,' it has been in force in one form
i. Acts 1831, P. L. 2o6. See Haight, J., in Commonwealth v. Jacob Reed's Sons, 25
Dauphin Co. 17 (Pa. 1922).
(875)
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or another with comparatively short intermissions ever since. In spite of the
opportunity of settling the legal and administrative problems involved, given by
over a hundred years' experience, it is remarkable how many questions remain
unsolved and how many inequalities in the tax burden imposed are still imbedded
in the law.
For a long time the tax was more honored in the breach than in the observ-
ance. Assessors made no particular effort to enforce payment against known
delinquents. Many owners of taxable property were not even called upon to
make returns and the waste basket was a favorite resting place for the blanks
sent to those citizens unfortunate enough to find themselves on the assessors'
mailing list. Recently, however, the need of the counties 2 for additional revenue,
together with a widespread feeling that large amounts of taxable property were
escaping the tax, have resulted in a tightening up of both legislative and admin-
istrative screws. The consequence has been two-fold: First, direction of public
attention to the defects of this part of the taxing system, and, second, growth
of a considerable demand for repeal of the tax and a general overhauling of the
tax system of the Commonwealth. It is the purpose of this article to consider,
some of the problems raised by the tax, and to call attention to the unsatisfactory
situation now existing.
The Personal Property Tax, often referred to as the Four Mills Tax, is
in reality two taxes imposed by Sections i and 17 of the Act of June 17, 1913,3
as amended. 4 One tax is levied on the owners of designated classes of per-
sonalty and is collected by the county. The other, sometimes known as the
Corporate Loans Tax, is collected by corporations from their security holders
as agents for the State. Section i of the Act imposes a tax for county purposes
at the rate of four mills on every dollar of value on the holders of mortgages,
moneys owing by solvent debtors, all articles of agreement and accounts bearing
interest, stocks, car trust securities, municipal and corporate bonds and loans
(except those issued by the Commonwealth or the United States and those taxed
under Section 17), all annuities yielding annually over two hundred dollars and
all other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of the State. Also
taxed are stages, omnibuses, hacks, cabs, and other vehicles used in transporting
passengers for hire, except steam and street passenger railway cars.
Exempted from taxation are numerous classes of property including bank
notes, notes discounted or negotiated by any banking institution, accounts and
debit balances owing to bankers and brokers in the usual courses of business,
securities held by bankers or brokers solely for trading purposes, deposit and
savings accounts, and the property of building and loan associations and vari-
ous classes of beneficial organizations, including labor unions. Corporations
paying a capital stock tax, and the stock of banks and trust companies liable to
the tax on shares, are also exempted.
2. Prior to I913, the tax imposed by Section i of the Act was a State tax. Since that
date, it has been collected by and used for the benefit of the counties. It should be remem-
bered, however, that the tax imposed by Section 17 is still for State purposes.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, §§ 4821, 4841.
4. The principal amending acts are those of PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72,
§§ 4861, 4862 (taxing under Section 17 securities assumed or on which interest is paid); PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93i) tit. 72, § 2141 (corporate loans tax applies to foreign corpora-
tions); PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i931) tit. 72, § 2121 (requiring notice by corporation to
holder of indebtedness); PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 4844 (assessment not to
prevent subsequent reassessment, penalty not included) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit.
72, § 4844 (executors to pay five years' back taxes) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93i) tit. 72,
§ 4821 (non-resident beneficiaries exempted in certain cases; exempting brokers and bankers
on accounts and debit balances and securities held for trading purposes; and exempting inter-
est bearing accounts in any bank or banking institution, savings institution, or trust company).
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Sections 2 to 16, inclusive, set forth the method of collecting the tax, pro-
vide penalties for non-payment and establish certain checks and safeguards de-
signed to prevent evasion.5
Section 17 imposes a tax, often referred to as the Corporate Loans Tax,
for state purposes, on all scrip, bonds, certificates and evidences of indebtedness
issued, assumed or on which interest is paid by corporations, municipalities or
other governmental units. Exempted are bank notes, notes discounted by bank-
ing institutions, savings institutions or trust companies; interest bearing accounts
in any bank, savings institution or trust company; building and loan associa-
tions and savings institutions having no capital stock; certain types of beneficial
associations, including mutual life and fire insurance companies; labor unions;
and corporations and associations liable to a capital stock tax with respect to
securities held in their own right and not in a fiduciary capacity."
Section 17 states the intent of the Act to be that only such personal prop-
erty as is not made taxable by this section for state purposes is subject to tax-
ation for county purposes under Section i of the Act.
7
By Section 4 of the Act of June 30, 1885,8 as amended,9 it is the duty of
the treasurer of every corporation paying interest or liable for the payment of
interest on obligations taxed by Section 17 of the 1913 Act,10 as amended, to
assess and remit to the State the tax payable by residents of the Commonwealth
owning such obligations, the sum due being deductible from the interest pay-
able to such resident.
From the foregoing outline, it will be seen that the tax is on certain enu-
merated classes of capital," being largely, though not entirely, restricted to in-
tangible personal property; that in reality two overlapping taxes at the same
rate are imposed, one for county and the other for state purposes; that in case
of conflict the tax for state purposes takes precedence; that there are many ex-
5. The County assessors are required to furnish each taxpayer annually with blanks
prepared by the Board of Revision of Taxes, or Commissioners of each county. On the
blanks the taxpayer must make a sworn return of all property which is subject to tax owned
by him on the date of the return. In the event that no return is forthcoming within ten days
after notice, it is the duty of the assessors to make a return for the taxpayer from the best
sources o~f information available. The County Commissioners or Board of Revision of
Taxes must review the return, add a fifty per cent. penalty thereto and proceed to the collec-
tion of the tax in the amount so determined. If facts subsequently become known which
indicate a liability greater than that assessed, not including the penalty as part of the assess-
ment, the county can move to collect the deficiency from the taxpayer or his estate for any
former year, not, however, exceeding five years. The executor of every estate is required to
file with the County Commissioners or Board of Revision of Taxes an affidavit showing the
property held by the decedent at the time of his death which is subject to the tax, whereupon
steps looking to the collection of any tax due are to be taken by the proper officials. The
Recorders of Deeds are required to furnish the tax officials with a list of all mortgages and
assignments thereof recorded in their offices and the prothonotaries of the various counties
must do the same with respect to judgments and instruments securing debts. Provisions for
notifying the tax officials of other counties of mortgages and judgments held by residents of
such other counties are also contained in the Act.
6. Presumably the draftsman intended the exemptions to apply to the securities of these
organizations. The Act, however, merely exempts the organizations themselves. Technically
it might be contended the securities are not within the exemption.
7. This portion of the section, together with the language taxing indebtedness assumed
on which interest is paid, was added by the amending Acts 1919, P. L. 955. The section as it
now reads may be found in PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 2121. The last amend-
ment was P. L. 98 (1933).
8. P. L. 193.
9. The last amendment giving the section as it now reads is PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1931) tit. 72, § 2162.
Io. At the time the Act of 1885 was passed there was a provision substantially similar to
Section 17 of the 1913 Act in effect.
I ii. In Dupuy v. Johns, 261 Pa. 40, 1O4 Atl. 565 (1918), the Supreme Court said the tax
was a property tax on the holders of the property enumerated.
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emptions from taxation-of which more hereinafter; and that the method of
collecting the tax places a heavy strain on the integrity of the individual taxpayer
in the one case and on the time and perspicacity of corporate treasurers in the
other.
Practical Objections
Before proceeding to a consideration of some of the legal problems involved,
it is pertinent to consider briefly the objections to the tax from a practical point
of view. They may be summarized as follows:
i. The tax is difficult to collect. An unscrupulous taxpayer can avoid the
tax imposed by Section i by filing a false return, with little chance of detection
unless he owns mortgages or judgments in his own name. The taxing authori-
ties are not equipped to investigate ownership of stocks and bonds or to follow
up cases where the return is apparently incomplete. There is no method by
which returns can be checked to determine their truth. As a result evasion is
widespread.
2. The tax yields comparatively little revenue. In Philadelphia County the
average amount collected under Section i for each of the last five years has
been about $5,000,000. During the same period, local and school taxes on real
estate in the same County averaged about forty-eight million dollars annually.
Collections for the entire State under Section 17 average only about $4,700,000
for the same period.
12
3. The tax is unequal on people of similar means and consequently un-
fair. Suppose A, B and C each have a net worth of $Ioo,ooo. A has his money
invested in bonds and stocks of several corporations, none of which do business
or are liable for taxation in Pennsylvania. He receives an annual income from
the bonds of five per cent., or $5ooo, and pays a personal property tax of four
mills, or $400, the equivalent of an income tax of eight per cent. B has invested
his $Ioo,ooo in the same securities as A. He has, however, pledged the bonds at
the X Trust Company for a loan of $8o,ooo, which sum he has invested in
common stock of the Y Company, which does no business in Pennsylvania and
pays no dividends. B must pay the X Company six per cent. interest on his
loan. $480o of this $5000 income is therefore expended in interest, netting B
$200. B's Personal Property Tax is four mills on $i8o,ooo, since moneys
owing by the taxpayer cannot be deducted in computing the tax. B's tax is,
12. Personal Property Tax and Real Estate Tax collections in Philadelphia County, in-
cluding penalties, were as follows:
Personal Property
1929 $4,918,133.83
1930 5,219,255.34
1931 5,060,872.15
1932 4,062,652.57
1933 3,5o2,869.55
Personal Property collections have in all years been approximately ninety-five per cent.
of the levy.
Real Estate
1929 $56,681,791.79 (which was 87.05% of the levy)
1930 5o,881,218.18 ( " . 83.60% " ( )
1931 48,785,793.23 ( " . 78.58% .. . .. )
1932 46,409,531.82 ( ". . 75.J6% " . .
)
1933 42,106,075.84 ( ". . 72.40% " 
( I )
Corporate Loans Tax collections for the last five years (excluding the tax on municipal
securities) were as follows:
1929 $4,592,452.62
1930 4,663,048.84
1931 5,957,933.37
1932 4,858,305.72
1933 3,992,538.96
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therefore, $720, or 360 per cent. of his net income. C's tale is a more cheerful
one. He has invested his $ioo,ooo in stock of the Z Company, which pays divi-
dends at the rate of eight per cent., netting C $8,ooo a year. Z is a Delaware
corporation, doing a small amount of business in Pennsylvania, and paying a
capital stock tax of five mills to the latter State based on the value of its tangible
property in the State consisting, let us say, of office furniture and fixtures valued
at $i,ooo. C's stock is free from personal property tax and its value is not ma-
terially affected by the burden of taxation imposed on the corporation by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the sum of $5.oo. Legalistic reasoning may
make the tax uniform and, therefore, constitutional. Practical common sense
replies that it is a levy both ridiculous and unfair.
Perhaps the chief objections to the tax from the viewpoint of equity are,
first, that it bears no relation to income, generally considered by modern taxing
authorities as the fairest test of capacity to pay; second, that it does not even
bear a relation to net worth, being based on gross assets from which liabilities
cannot be deducted. This places the heaviest burden upon those members of
the community who are actively engaged in business, as opposed to those who
live in retirement on the return from their capital; third, that the many exemp-
tions favor individuals and organizations holding certain classes of investments
without a corresponding contribution to the community by the exempt class, for
example, the holders of stock of foreign corporations doing a small amount of
business in the State.
Constitutionality
There is some question whether Section i of the Personal Property Tax
is constitutional. Article IX of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873 forbids
tax exemptions, other than those specified,"3 and requires that all taxes shall be
uniform on the same classes of subjects. These requirements, however, have
been so refined by construction that one would be rash to hazard an opinion
that at the present day the tax would be declared void. There is, however, no
case which flatly sustains Section i in anything like its present form. Fox's
Appeal 14 at least raises the question of the validity of many of the exemptions
now granted 1 and indicates that the constitutional requirement of uniformity
is too important to be frittered away by construction. As pointed out above,
legal and practical uniformity are by no means identical, but certainly the many
inequalities in the tax permit of a strong case against its validity on this ground.
The validity of Section 17 would appear to be settled by Commonwealth z. Del-
aware Div. Canal Co.' 6
Situs
One of the most important questions under the Act arises when the prop-
erty taxed is within the taxable jurisdiction of the State. Pennsylvania follows
the general rule as to the taxation of intangibles. They are held to follow the
domicile of their owner. If A is domiciled in Pennsylvania, his stocks, bonds
and other intangible property are also in Pennsylvania for tax purposes, re-
gardless of the physical location of the certificates evidencing ownership of the
13. The exemptions specified are: "Public property used for public purposes, actual
places of religious worship, places of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit,
institutions of purely public charity and real and personal property owned, occupied and used
by any branch, post or camp of honorably discharged soldiers, sailors and marines."
14. 112 Pa. 337, 4 Ati. 149 (1886).
15. In Dupuy v. Johns, 261 Pa. 40, 48, 104 Atl. 56 568 (1918) the Court said obiter that
. the fundamental validity of tax immunities such as those therein provided for is now
beyond question ..
16. 123 Pa. 594, 16 Atl. 584 (1889), holding that Section 4 of the Act of June 3o, 1885,
P. L. 193, which was the legislative predecessor of the present Section 17, did not violate the
constitutional requirement of uniformity.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
property involved.17 Similarly, non-residents of Pennsylvania are not taxable
on intangible personalty held by them, even though they be the stocks and bonds
of Pennsylvania corporations lodged in a safe deposit box in Philadelphia. The
same is true of the stocks, bonds and bank accounts of a Delaware corporation,
which maintains a formal office only in the latter State and conducts all of its
business from an office in Philadelphia.1 8  This last question becomes important
in determining whether the Delaware corporation is liable for a capital stock
tax, in which case the shares are free from the Personal Property Tax, as is
hereinafter shown. Recent cases in the Supreme Court of the United States
have indicated that the Pennsylvania view on the taxation of intangibles is in
accord with general constitutional principles.19
Most of the cases in Pennsylvania on situs arise under either the capital
stock tax or the inheritance tax. The principles determined, however, are
equally applicable to the Personal Property Tax. The rule regarding tangible
property is that it is taxable where permanently located. If it is not permanently
located, the domicile of the owner is the taxable situs.
2 0
Difficult problems arise in connection with trust estates. Suppose, for ex-
ample, the A Trust Company located in Pennsylvania is trustee of an estate of
which B, a resident of Massachusetts, is cestui que trust. Part of the trust
estate consists of bonds of the C Company, a Pennsylvania corporation conduct-
ing its principal business within the State. The Attorney General's Office has
ruled that the bonds are subject to the Corporate Loans Tax,2 ' and this ruling
seems in accord with the plain reading of Section 17 of the Act of 1913, which
imposes taxes on all corporate loans regardless of the domicile of the holder,
but which is restrained in its operation to bonds and other securities owned by
residents. 22  If the property be a mortgage on some other security taxable under
Section i, instead of Section 17, the same result would follow, since that section
of the Act includes trustees among the taxable subjects. If, however, the trustee
is non-resident and the beneficiary resident, the same rule is applied, on the
theory that the cestui que trust "may be said in some sense to own them" within
the meaning of the Statute. 2  Mobilia personam sequuntur is, therefore, of use
to the taxpayer only when the personamn involved is not a dual personality, one-
half of which is located in the Commonwealth. Apparently recognizing that
considerable hardship was involved in following the above principles to their
logical conclusion, the legislature in 1929 24 amended the Act, so as to exempt
17. Commonwealth v. Buffalo & Lake Erie Traction Co., 233 Pa. 79, 81 Atl. 932 (1911);
Commonwealth v. Hudson Coal Co., 14 Dauphin Co. 137 (Pa. 1911). Pennsylvania has never
attempted to tax intangibles on the ground that they have acquired a situs for taxation other
than at the domicile of their owner through becoming integral parts of some local business.
Cf. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 213 (193o) and cases there
cited.
18. Commonwealth v. Curtis Pub. Co., 237 Pa. 333, 85 Atl. 36o (1912), and cases there
cited are in accord with this rule and indicate that any attempt to tax intangible property
more extensively is open to grave constitutional objections.
i. Cf. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. I (1928) ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Min-
nesota, 28o U. S. 204 (1930) ; First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
20. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925) ; Commonwealth v. Clyde Steamship
Co., 268 Pa. 278, IiO Atl. 532 (1920). See, however, City Bank v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112
(1934), holding that works of art loaned to a museum in Pennsylvania by a non-resident can
acquire a taxable situs in the State sufficient to sustain imposition of Inheritance Tax.
21. Tax on Corporate Loans, 2 D. & C. 438 (Pa. 1922). It has been suggested that the
holders taxable under Section 17 are those mentioned in Section i, the draftsman havihg for-
gotten to set them forth.
22. Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300 (U. S. 1872).
23. Commonwealth v. Clyde Steamship Co., 268 Pa. 278, iio At. 532 (192o) ; Frick v.
Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925) ; City Bank v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 1Iz (934) ; Com-
monwealth v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 129 Pa. 429, 18 At. 125 (1889).
24. PA. SrAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 4821.
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from the operation of Section i taxable property thereafter received by a resi-
dent trustee from a non-resident individual or a foreign corporation not doing
business in the State for the use, benefit or advantage of any individual or for-
eign corporation not doing business in the State. The scope of the exemption
is necessarily narrow, since it does not include securities held by trustees on the
date of the Act or securities otherwise taxable if the trust was created by a resi-
dent for the benefit of a non-resident beneficiary.
25
Another difficult problem of situs arises in connection with partnerships,
some of whose members reside outside the State. The Act requires partner-
ships "resident, located or liable to taxation within this Commonwealth" to pay
the tax on taxable property "owned, held or possessed" by them. Suppose the
investment banking firm of Jones & Company has offices in Boston, New York
and Philadelphia, with two partners resident in each city. The firm owns for
investment taxable securities worth, say $i,ooo,ooo, certificates evidencing own-
ership being held in all three cities in equal amounts. How much tax must the
partnership pay ?
It is obvious that any one of several theories might be applied to determine
the amount payable, the most logical, in view of the language of the Act, being
that the entire amount is subject to tax. The result of such a theory on whati
remains in these depression years of the business of investment bankers in the
State can well be imagined. Perhaps fortunately, the assessors of Philadelphia
County have adopted the practical, if somewhat liberal, rule that the tax is pay-
able only on those securities physically located within the State on the day the
partnership makes its return. 26 It is at least possible that a judicious use of
25. An important question closely related to situs arises in connection with the duty im-
posed on the treasurers of corporations to assess and collect the tax levied by Section 17 on
the obligations of all corporations doing business in the State. This method of collecting the
Corporate Loans Tax was first established in 1864 by the Act of April 30, P. L. 218. The
provisions in force at present are the Acts of June 30, 1885, P. L. 193-4; July 2r, 1919, P. L.
1067, § I; May 4, 1927, P. L. 741, § i ; and April 25, 1929, P. L. 669, § i. The section as it
now reads may be found in PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 2162. Failure of the
treasurer so to act imposes a tax liability on the corporation. Commonwealth v. Lehigh Val-
ley R. R., 129 Pa. 429, 18 Atl. 410 (1889) ; Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co.,
145 Pa. 53, 22 Atl. 2,5 (1891).
If, however, the treasurer is not a resident of the State, there is no power in the State to
force him to perform the duties of assessment and collection, and consequently no liability on
the corporation results from his failure to do so. Commonwealth v. Barrett Mfg. Co., 246
Pa. 3O, 92 AtI. 302 (1914).
In 1919 the legislature attempted to remedy this situation by imposing the obligation to
assess and pay the tax on -all foreign corporations registered and doing business in the State
without regard to the residence of the treasurer or other fiscal officers. PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 2141. Since the difficulty was not legislative but constitutional, this
effort was held ineffective (Commonwealth v. American Ice Co., i D. & C. 122 (Pa. 1921)],
and the owners of bonds of corporations whose treasurers reside and work outside the State
are consequently another favored class of tax-exempt citizens. Section i of the Act ex-
pressly exempts "such as are made taxable for State purposes by Section 17 hereof", and the
inability of the State to collect the tax would seem to have no bearing on the question of
whether or not it was imposed.
Suppose, however, the treasurer of X Company, a New Jersey corporation, lives in Cam-
den but has his office in Philadelphia, in which latter city the corporation conducts a large
part of its business and from which place it pays the interest on its bonds. In such circum-
stances, the tax must be paid by the corporation for the bondholders [Commonwealth v. Sun
Oil Co., 294 Pa. 99, 143 Atl. 495 (1928)], for the treasurer has acquired an "official domicile"
within the state. Of necessity, the law draws fine distinctions. It may be wondered whether
a different result would follow if the treasurer lived in Philadelphia and worked in the com-
pany's offices in Camden. Any law which results in such strained interpretation to achieve
desirable results is open to serious objection.
26. Cf. Commonwealth v. Schmelz, T14 Va. 364, 76 S. E. 95 (913), holding that intan-
gible personal property of a private banker, having offices in different counties, should be
taxed in the county "where located". Mobilia personanm sequuntur yields to principles more
realistic if less immutable.
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the facilities of interstate commerce is sometimes employed to reduce the tax.
The interesting question of the extent to which a State can tax partnership assets
when only some of the members of the firm are residents remains, therefore,
undetermined.
The difficulties raised in determining situs for purposes of taxation illus-
trate the inherent weakness of a tax on intangible personal property. Modern
commercial and financial dealings transcend state lines to such an extent that
attempts to establish a fixed burden on securities in the form of an annual cap-
ital levy are foredoomed to failure. An estate tax is practical, because the cer-
tainty of dTeath and the uncertainty of the time of its occurrence; together with
the necessity of court administration of decedents' estates, combine to aid an
accurate and honest assessment. An income tax is practical, because the federal
return provides a basis for state taxation and a check on the accuracy of state-
ments made. But a Personal Property Tax has no such aids to collection. Ac-
cordingly, it is not surprising that it has been discarded by state after state in
favor of other taxes more in accord with modern business practice.
The Exemption of Shares of Stock of Corporations Liable for Capital
Stock Tax
One of the most interesting legal problems arising out of the tax is the
extent of the exemption from the tax imposed by Section I of shares of stock
in corporations which are liable for a capital stock tax to the State, or exempted
therefrom by law.17 All Pennsylvania corporations conducted for profit 28 and
all foreign corporations "doing business in and liable to taxation within this
Commonwealth or having capital or property employed or used in this Com-
monwealth" are taxed at the rate of five mills on that portion of their net worth
which has a taxable situs in Pennsylvania and is not engaged in manufacturing
or laundering."' The problems of construction which arise out of the Capital
Stock Tax Act are sufficient to merit a volume to themselves and are only
touched on here to the extent that they affect the exemption from the Personal
Property Tax of the shares of such corporations. Obviously, in determining
whether or not to return for Personal Property Tax his stock in Corporation
B, incorporated in Delaware, taxpayer A must discover for himself whether
Corporation B is doing business in and liable for taxation within the State and
has capital employed or used in the State. He cannot determine the answer
accurately by inquiring from the proper officials at Harrisburg or from the local
assessors whether Corporation B has registered to do business in Pennsylvania
or pays a capital stock tax to the State,30 although this is the method generally
employed by those taxpayers of sufficient integrity to be alarmed at the possi-
bility of not including all their taxable property in a sworn return. A foreign cor-
poration may be doing business in Pennsylvania without being liable to taxation
because it owns no taxable property in the State.31 On the other hand, it may
own capital in the State without employing or using it (for example, abandoned
mines), in which case it might not be liable for the Capital Stock Tax.32 And
the fact that it pays the Capital Stock Tax is of no importance in determining
the liability of its securities for the Personal Property Tax, if it is not in fact
27. Section i of the Act of 1913, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 4821, taxes:"all shares of stock . . . except shares . . . in any . . . corporation . . . which
may be liable to a tax on its shares or its capital stock . . . or relieved ,from the payment
of tax on the shares or capital stock by the laws of this Commonwealth."
28. Except banks, savings institutions, title insurance or trust companies, building and
loans and foreign insurance companies.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 1901.
30. McMullin's Estate, 272 Pa. 284, ii6 Atl. 232 (1922).
31. Callery's Appeal, 272 Pa. 255, 1I6 Atl. 222 (1922).
32. Cf. id. at 26o, I16 Atl. at 223.
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liable for such tax, since the county assessors are not bound by the action of the
state authorities in assessing and accepting the tax. Nor does the fact that it
does not pay the Capital Stock Tax affect the situation, since it may be legally
liable for such tax and, if it is, under the wording of the Act its securities are
free from the Personal Property Tax.
The conscientious taxpayer must, therefore, resolve all doubts against him-
self and pay the tax on his shares, or else spend a considerable amount of time
and effort in determining to what extent foreign Corporation B meets the qual-
ifications necessary to entitle its shareholders to exemption from the Personal
Property Tax.
Let us turn for a moment to taxpayer X, a man of different parts. X is a
millionaire many times over. He has a constitutional aversion to those twin
calamities, death and taxation, and a determination that the latter at least shall
pass him by. He causes to be formed under the laws of Delaware the Y Com-
pany, to which he transfers several million dollars' worth of securities, all of
which are subject to the Personal Property Tax in X's hands. The Y Corpo-
ration issues all of its stock to X, buys $iooo worth of office furniture, which
it installs in an office in Philadelphia occupied by X, its president, and a book-
keeper. Y engages in the business of clipping coupons from bonds and deposit-
ing dividends in a Philadelphia bank. It registers to do business in Pennsyl-
vania and pays a capital stock tax of $5.oo. 33 X does not report his shares in
Y for Personal Property taxation, on the ground that they are exempt therefrom
because Y pays a capital stock tax. And X's lawyer will find good authority to
sustain his client's position in Dupay v. Johns.3 4 And if it be suggested that
in that case the Supreme Court warned against tax evasion, it might be replied
that the shares of stock of many an investment trust, whose only Pennsylvania
assets were office furniture and fixtures, have been sold in Pennsylvania during
the last decade on the strength of legal opinions that they were free from the
Personal Property Tax. Moreover, X's attorney can quote from the opinion
of Mr. Justice Holmes in Bullen v. Wisconsin--
"We do not speak of [tax] evasion, because, when the law draws a
line, a case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none
the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full of what the law
permits. When an act is condemned as an evasion what is meant is that it
is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy if not by the mere
letter of the law." '
The "line" has been drawn by the Supreme Court in Dupuy v. Johns, by
giving to the taxation statutes their plain and ordinary meaning."6 If X's stock
is held taxable, it will not be because X falls on the wrong side of the line drawn
in Dupuy v. Johns, but because the Supreme Court or the legislature has seen fit
to change the location of the line.
Validity of x929 Amendnwnt Exempting Certain Assets of Brokers and Bankers
Interesting questions arise in connection with an amendment to the taxing
Act passed by the legislature in I929.7z This amendment exempted from tax-
ation "loans, shares of stock, or other securities held by bankers or brokers
33. The Capital Stock Tax would have to be over $5o as a practical matter, or X (if
conscientious) might get caught, since the Philadelphia assessors require all stocks to be re-
turned for personal property taxation if the corporation does not pay a capital stock tax in
excess of that sum.
34. 261 Pa. 40, lO4 At. 565 (1918).
35. 240 U. S. 625, 630 (1916).
36. Mr. Justice Simpson to the contrary notwithstanding. Cf. his concurring opinion in
Callery's Appeal, 272 Pa. 255, 116 AtI. 222 (1922).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 4821.
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solely for trading purposes", and also "accounts or debit balances owing by cus-
tomers of bankers or brokers in the usual courses of business."
This amendment was passed in order to correct an obvious injustice which
arose when a serious effort was first made to collect the tax a few years ago.
Suppose the banking and brokerage firm of Jones & Company of Philadelphia
have a capital of $i,ooo,ooo. They are members of the New York Stock Ex-
change and carry margin accounts for customers whose debit balances aggre-
gate, say, $2,000,000. They are also engaged in distributing securities, and on
the day on which their Personal Property Tax return is filed they own $2,000,-
ooo of taxable securities, which their salesmen are endeavoring to dispose of to
customers. The customers' securities are re-hypothecated, and a large portion
of the stock and bonds which the firm is distributing is also borrowed against,
the securities being withdrawn from time to time as sales are made. Conse-
quently a considerable part-let us say half-of the firm's million dollar capital
is free for other purposes. Let us assume that $250,000 is deposited in cash
in the various banks which have loaned money to the firm, while the other $250,-
ooo is invested in a firm trading account in securities subject to tax. Prior to
1929 (at which time banks generally allowed interest on deposits) Jones & Com-
pany's tax should have been computed as follows:
Tax on $2,000,000 customers' debit balances ("accounts bearing
interest and money owing by solvent debtors") $ 8,000
Tax on $250,000 cash on deposit ("accounts bearing interest and
money owing by solvent debtors") I,000
Tax on $250,000 firm trading account securities ("loans issued by
corporations secured by bonds and shares of stock of corpo-
rations") 1,000
Tax on $2,000,000 securities for sale to customers ("loans issued
by corporation secured by bonds and shares of stock in cor-
poration") 8,000
$18,000
The tax rate is, then, .oi8 on the $i,ooo,ooo capital instead of .oo4. This would
be equivalent to an income tax of thirty per cent. if the capital yielded a six per
cent. return.
Undoubtedly, the tax on bankers and brokers was unjust and an amend-
ment to the Act was in order. Let us see, however, the net result of the 1929
amendment on the tax liability of Jones & Company, assuming its portfolio
remained unchanged.
i. Tax on $2,000,000 customers' debit balance o
2. Tax on $250,000 cash on deposit o
3. Tax on $250,000 firm trading account o
4. Tax on $2,000,0oo securities for sale to customers o
Total tax o
Item i comes clearly within the terms of the amending Act.
Item 2 was exempted from taxation by the Act of April 21, 1933, P. L.
54, recently held constitutional in Estate of James Donnelly. 8
As to Item 3, the question arises what do the words "solely for trading
purposes" mean? The Philadelphia County assessors have ruled that securities
owned for less than three months and held for sale are held solely for trading
purposes. In other words, if Jones & Company get-rid of their commitments
with reasonable speed, they are not subject to tax. If they own certain stocks
and bonds on which the dust has accumulated, then they are taxable--a rule ap-
38. 113 Pa. Super. 274 (1934).
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parently based on the maxim that the race is to the swift. It should be remem-
bered, however, that the tax return is made by the taxpayer and that the words
"solely for trading purposes" have yet to be interpreted by the courts. The part-
ners of Jones & Company might well take the position that the bonds of the X
Company, which they have been trying to dispose of since 189o, are "held solely
for trading purposes", but that since it takes two to make a trade business is not
brisk.
Item 4 consists of securities "held solely for trading purposes" and con-
sequently is exempt.
It is common knowledge that prior to 1929 unincorporated bankers and
brokers paid no Personal Property Tax because the rate was confiscatory and
the assessors negligent. It is becoming increasingly obvious that since that date
they pay little, if any, tax because the 1929 and 1933 amendments have exempted
most of their assets from taxation.
If such bankers and brokers did a deposit business instead of an invest-
ment banking business, the same result would follow, although, owing to the
Banking Act of 1933, the firm could no longer engage in distributing and under-
writing securities other than governments and municipals. Customers' debit bal-
ances become deposits; cash is still deposited in other banks or held in the till;
the firm trading account is merged with the securities owned, which are now
held for investment instead of for sale to customers. The tax result is the same.
Let us assume, therefore, that there is a substantial amount of capital in-
vested in private banks taking deposits, which pays no Personal Property Tax
whatever, as a result of the 1929 amendment.39 These concerns are also subject
to a gross receipts tax,40 but this tax also is practically disregarded, having
yielded an average of only about $2o,ooo in the entire State during the last five
years.4 ' The moneyed capital invested in private banking is consequently tax free
for practical purposes. Shares of stock in national banks are taxed at the rate
of four mills, their value being computed by adding the capital, surplus and un-
divided profits of the bank and dividing by the number of shares outstanding.
42
Permission to impose such a tax on instrumentalities of the federal govern-
ment is given by Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.
4 3
This permission, however, is qualified by the following language:
"The tax imposed shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon
the moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State coming
into competition with the business of national banks; . . .
Any state tax which violates this restriction is void, and for seventy-five years
the Supreme Court of the United States has been scrutinizing with care innu-
merable state statutes, many of which have been held to violate this provision
of the federal statutes.
There would seem to be good ground for believing that the business of
private banking, even as restricted by recent legislation, competes with the
business of national banks. As was said in People v. Goldfogle:
"A long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
defines the business of banking and holds that the words 'moneyed capital
in the hands of individual citizens' includes moneys invested in private bank-
39. Recent federal legislation requiring separation of investment and commercial banking
activities would not seem to affect the problem.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93i) tit. 72, § 2221.
41. Cf. the Auditor General's ANNuAL REPoRTs. In i932 the total collections were only
$9,I55.27.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, §§ 1931, 1932, 1951, i961.
43. Last amended by 44 STAT. 223 (1926), 12 U. S. C. A. § 548 (Supp. 1934).
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ing houses such as J. P. Morgan & Co., Kuhn Loeb & Co., and others, to-
gether with investments of individuals in securities that represent money
at interest and other evidences of indebtedness such as normally enter into
the business of banking. The national government permits State taxation
only on terms of substantial equality in law and in fact, and entire fair-
ness and friendliness. The tax on national bank shares must not discrimi-
nate in favor of moneyed capital entering into competition with the national
banks." 11
There seems to be equally good ground for believing that the tax assessed
on national bank shares is at a greater rate than that assessed against the com-
peting capital of private bankers. In Boyer v. Boyer, a case dealing with a
predecessor of the present four mills tax, the Supreme Court of the United States
said:
"From these cases may be deduced certain rules for the construction
of that act; [Section 5219, Revised Statutes]
(I) That the words 'at a greater rate than is assessed upon other
moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens' refer to the entire proc-
ess of assessment, which, in the case of national bank shares, includes both
their valuation and the rate of percentage on such valuation; consequently,
that the act of Congress is violated if, in connection with a fixed percent-
age applicable to the valuation alike of national bank shares and of other
moneyed investments or capital, the State law establishes or permits a mode
of assessment by which such shares are valued higher in proportion to their
real value than is other moneyed capital." "
If the situation regarding the taxation of the capital of private bankers re-
ferred to above can be proved, it would seem that the tax on national bank
shares is void.46 If it is, certainly the opponents of the Personal Property Tax
are entitled to write a triumphant Q. E. D. after a perfectly demonstrated re-
ductio ad absurdum.
Conclusion
In 1927, an able and impartial commission made a survey of the taxation
system of the Commonwealth and came to the following conclusion regarding
the Personal Property Tax:
"The further study of the Commission leads it to reaffirm its conclu-
sion that this tax, in its incidents, administration, and collection is one of
the most unsatisfactory taxes in the entire fiscal machinery of the State.
It is quite clear that there is a large amount of personal property taxable,
which is escaping taxation, and that in many cases, except with reference
to mortgages, judgments and trust estates, the administration of the tax is
more or less of a dead letter. This fact has long been recognized by econ-
omists and tax experts and was admitted in reports of tax investigations
in various States upwards of half a century ago. Many of the States have
abandoned this form of tax. Others have tried various means of effecting
a more complete assessment, but the testimony is generally to the effect
44. 234 N. Y. 345, 351, 137 N. E. 611, 613 (1922). See also First Nat. Bank v. City of
Hartford, 273 U. S. 548 (1927) ; Minnesota v. First Nat. Bank, 273 U. S. 561 (1927).
45. 113 U. S. 689, 695 (I885).
46. Space prevents a more extensive consideration of a question full of refinements and
difficulties. The writer is convinced, however, after a rather complete survey of all the
cases, that the 1929 amendment to the Personal Property Tax does violate the prohibitions of
Section 5219, with the result that the tax on shares of national bank stock is unconstitutional.
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that only a fraction of the property liable to the tax is assessed, and that
the form is so inequitable that public sentiment indulges evasion."
47
It is submitted that that conclusion grows increasingly sound as the archaic
nature of the tax becomes more and more apparent. It is unpopular, unfair and
uncollectible, and the time has come to wipe it off the statute books and replace
it with a levy more in accord with modem theory and practice. It is hoped
that in its efforts to meet the revenue needs of the Commonwealth by revising
the tax system, the new administration will be able to abolish one of our least
effective survivals of a past that is no more.
Joseph S. Clark, Jr.t
t Member of the Philadelphia bar.
47. FINAL REPORT OF PENNSYLVANA TAX CommisslO TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSyLVANIA (1927).
